

The document below is hereby signed.

Signed: March 18, 2019



S. Martin Teel, Jr.

S. Martin Teel, Jr.
United States Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

In re)	
)	
SHELLEY EVELYN SLOAN,)	Case No. 18-00676
)	(Chapter 13)
Debtor.)	
<hr/>)	
)	
SHELLEY EVELYN SLOAN,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	
)	Adversary Proceeding No.
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC)	19-10001
d/b/a/ MR. COOPER, <i>et. al.</i> ,)	
)	Not for publication in
Defendants.)	West's Bankruptcy Reporter.

MEMORANDUM DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS

The plaintiff, Shelley Evelyn Sloan, has filed a complaint that is a consistent string of rambling, conclusory allegations that make no sense. The defendants, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper and U.S. Bank National Association, not in its individual capacity but solely as Trustee for NRZ Pass-Through Trust VIII, have filed a *Motion to Dismiss* (Dkt. No. 4) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

That motion will be granted.

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A court will dismiss a complaint if it does not plead sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." *Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal cites deleted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." *Id.* "[T]he Court [does] not requir[e] heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Id.* at 547. The Supreme Court has explained this plausibility standard in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) as:

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. *Id.*, at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. *Ibid.* Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" *Id.*, at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted).

